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notice to pursue the Massiahclaim in his first federal habeas petition, as
he had done in his first state petition. Id. at 1473.
In its installation of the cause and prejudice standard, the Court also
dispensed with the argument that the State's withholding of the Evans
statement was misconduct. Because the State turned over the 21-page
document upon request in 1987, the District Court had found no
wrongful conduct in the State's failure to hand it over earlier, and the
"document [was] not critical to McCleskey's notice of a Massiahclaim
anyway." Id. at 1474 (emphasis added).

In response to this decision, it is appropriate to raise on habeas
every federal claim remotely suggested by the trial evidence or subsequent investigation in hopes that further investigation will strengthen it.
Second, the trial record should show detailed inquiry concerning the
existence of Massiahrelationships, as well as Giglio and Brady materials. If possible, the Commonwealth's attorney should be required to
deny on the record the existence of any such evidence.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. Mclnerney

LANKFORD v. IDAHO
111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS

ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA

In 1983, Lankford was convicted as an alder and abettor to a robbery
and double murder under Idaho's felony-murder statute. At his arraignment, the judge had informed Lankford that the maximum punishment he
could receive if convicted was either life imprisonment or the death
penalty.
Prior to his sentencing hearing Lankford requested, and the trial court
ordered, that the State give notice ofwhether it intended to seek the death
penalty and, if so, what aggravating circumstances the State would offer
in support of the death penalty. The State responded that it would not seek
the death penalty. Lankford proceeded to file numerous motions with the
trial court. The court failed to mention the possibility of imposing the
death penalty at all proceedings after the arraignment.
At the sentencing hearing, Lankford was represented by a new
attorney who was denied access to the trial transcript that included the
arraignment. The prosecutor offered no evidence, relied on the trial
record, and explained why he had not recommended the death penalty.
Lankford's counsel made no reference to the death penalty. The trialjudge
stated th at he found Lankford's testimony to b e unworthy ofbelief and that
the State's recommendation of an indeterminate life sentence was too
lenient. Following a weekend recess, the trial judge sentenced Lankford
to death.
Lankford appealed on thegrounds that the trial courthad violated due
process by not giving notice that it intended to consider the death penalty
despite the State's notice that it would not ask for the death penalty. The
trial court responded that Lankford was provided notice through the Idaho
Code and that the prosecutor's intent not to seek the death penalty was not
controlling. The Idaho supreme court affirmed and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court began its reasoning by stating that the issue in
this case was one of procedure rather than one of substantive power.
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho's substantive law, a trial judge's power to
disregard a prosecutor's recommendation as to sentencing is not limited
by this decision.
The Court stated that the trial court's presentencing order was
analogous to a pretrial order limiting the issues to be tried in that it ordered
the parties to state the aggravating and mitigating factors on which they
intended to rely at the penalty hearing.
Lack of notice to Lankford, the Court found, also inhibited his
counsel from presenting evidence of mitigating factors unique to imposition of the death penalty. For example, Lankford had taken two polygraph
tests before the trial which tended to support his contention that he did not
do the actual killing. Under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),
Lankford argued, these tests would have been admissible at the penalty
phase of his trial since they would have shown that his degree of
participation was not that of the actual killer. This evidence, the Court
held, might have influenced the trial court's deliberations as to whether to
impose the death penalty. Therefore, Lankfordrecognizes the continued
validity of cases such as Green v. Georgia,442 U.S. 95 (1979) (holding
that some evidence is admissible at the penalty stage of a capital murder
trial that would not be admissible under ordinary rules of evidence) and
Enmund v. Florida,458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that in some circumstances the death penalty may not be constitutionally imposed on an
accomplice). These issues arise only in the context of a capital penalty
trial. It is imperative that Virginia defense counsel know what issues are
to be litigated at the penalty stage in order to meet prosecution evidence
in aggravation and to offer mitigating evidence to the sentencer. Notice
of the issues to be litigated also allows defense counsel to make use of
favorable law relevant to the presentation of mitigating evidence at the
sentencing hearing.
Although the Court noted that the presentencing order "did not
expressly place any limits on counsel's preparation," 111 S. Ct. at 1729,
the question is whether "counsel had adequate notice of the critical issue
that the judge was actually debating." Id. at 1729. The Court quoted
Justice Frankfurter: "The validity and moral authority of a conclusion
largely depend on the mode by which it was reached ... No better
instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth than to give a person
in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity
to meet it." JointAnti-FascistRefugee Committee v. McGrath,341 U.S.
123 (1951).
It is well established that one vital function of the adversarial
process ofthe guilt phase of a capital trial is truth-seeking. To reiterate the
equivalency of the sentencing hearing to the guilt phase as far as counsel

HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the Idaho court's holding and remanded. The Court held that "the sentencing process in this case violated
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because at the time
of the sentencing hearing, Lankford and his counsel did not have adequate
notice that the judge might sentence him to death." 111 S.Ct. 1723, 1724
(1991). The Court held that lack of notice to Lankford created an
impermissible risk that the adversary process may have malfunctioned.
The Court found that the notice provided by the Idaho statute and the
arraignment did not survive the State's response to the court order because
the order limited the issues in further proceedings.
The Court further found that the trial judge's silence following the
State's response to the order "had the practical effect of concealing from
the parties the principal issue to be decided at the hearing." Id. at 1723.
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and adversarial functions are concerned, theLankfordCourtcitedStrickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a capital sentencing
hearing is enough like a trial to warrant the same adversarial standards as
a trial). The Court reasoned, therefore, that without notice of the issues to
be litigated at the penalty stage, the benefit of the adversarial process is
negated. Since in Lankford the trial judge was silent as to the principal
issue to be litigated (i.e. a possible death sentence), the Court found that
the adversarial process may have malfunctioned.
Since federal law requires that narrowing construction be given to
the three "vileness factors" (i.e. "torture, depravity ofmind or aggravated
battery to the victim" Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.4(C)), Virginia defense
counsel need to know upon which of the three factors the Commonwealth
intends to rely during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial and what

narrowing construction will be applied. Thus, after Lanlford, pretrial
litigation of Virginia's "vileness factors" becomes even more important.
See Lago, Litigating the "Vileness" Factorin Virginia, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue. Filing a Bill of Particulars allows defense counsel to
acquire notice offactor(s) upon which the Commonwealth intends to rely.
The purpose of presentencing orders, the Court noted, is "to eliminate the need to address matters that are not in dispute, and thereby save
the valuable time ofjudges and lawyers." 111 S. Ct. at 1729. Thus, the
Bill ofParticulars will not only provide notice of the issues to be litigated
at the sentencing phase of the capital trial, it will promote judicial
efficiency as well.
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles

YATES v. EVATT
111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Dale Robert Yates was charged with murder during the commission
of a robbery in Greenville County, South Carolina. Yates, armed with a
handgun, and Henry Davis, an accomplice, armed with a knife, entered a
store and accosted the proprietor. After acquiring the money, Yates shot
twice, wounding the proprietor slightly. Yates then fled. Davis remained
and scuffled with the proprietor. As the two struggled, the proprietor's
mother intervened. Davis stabbed her once and she died almost immediately. The proprietor thendrewapistolandkilledDavis. Yates was found
guilty of murder as an accomplice and sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction. State v. Yates, 280 S.C.
29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982).
Yates sought relief at state habeas asserting that the burden-shifting
effect of ajury instruction was unconstitutional. The instruction to which
Yates objected dictated that malice is implied or presumed from (1) the
"willful, deliberate, and intentional doing of an unlawful act" or (2) the
"use of a deadly weapon." Although the state court denied relief, the
Supreme Court of the United States remanded for further consideration in
light of its decisions in Sandstrom v. Montana,442 U.S. 510 (1979) and
Francisv. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 896
(1985). On remand, the state supreme court failed to apply retroactively
the principles settled in those decisions. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and remanded again for further proceedings. Yates v.
Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1987).
Upon second remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized that the two charges regarding implied malice were erroneous;
however, it again denied relief, holding that the error was harmless. Yates
v. Aiken, 301 S.C. 214, 391 S.E.2d 530 (1989). In that opinion, the state
court claimed that the error was harmless because the jury did not have to
rely on the presumption of malice given the "facts" which the reviewing
court mistakenly posed as Davis lunging at the mother and stabbing,
giving her multiple wounds.
For the third time, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review the case.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court of
South Carolina applied the wrong standard in determining whether the
challenged instructions constituted harmless error. The Court also found
that the Supreme Court of South Carolina misread the trial court record to
which the standard was applied.

UndertheUnited States Supreme Court's analysis based onSandstrom
and Francis,the malice instruction given in Yates was erroneous because
it did not require the state to establish all elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that
the fourteenth amendment protects the accused from conviction except
uponproof beyond areasonable doubt of every factnecessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged). The instructions given to the jury in
this case may not be excused as harmless error because they erroneously
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, thus violating Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
The United States Supreme Court found that the state court's inquiry
into the constitutionality ofthe jury's malice instruction did not satisfy the
properharmless error standard as promulgated in Chapmanv. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967). An error is harmless only if it appears "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." Id. at 24 (emphasis added). The state court employed
improper analysis in determining merely that it was not necessary for the
jury to rely on the unconstitutional presumption created by the malice
instruction.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A. Jury Instruction Erroneous
The due process clause ofthe fourteenth amendment requires that the
prosecution establish every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt
before an accused may be convicted. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Instructions which shift this burden of proof on the issue of intent to the
defendant are unconstitutional. Mullaney, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). This rule
was developed further in Sandstromv. Montana,442 U.S. 510 (1979). In
Sandstrom, the jury was given an instruction that "the law presumes that
a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." Id. at
513,524. This instruction was held unconstitutional as a violation ofboth
the Winship and Mullaney requirements. The Court applied the same
principle in Francisv. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). The Francis
instructions stated that "the acts ofa person of sound mind and discretion
are presumed to be the product of the person's will" and that a person "is
presumed to intend the natural andprobable consequences of his acts." Id.
at 316-318. These instructions, like those given in Sandstrom, fail to
comply with the requirements of Winship and Mullaney.
In Yates, the charge instructing the jurors on the issue of malice was
two-fold. The trial judge told the jury that malice is to be implied or
presumed upon (1) the willful, deliberate & intentional doing of an
unlawful act, and (2) the use of a deadly weapon.

